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COMMENTS
VALUE IN THE COMMERCIAL LAW OF NEW YORX.-The doctrine that a
bona fide purchaser for value of a legal title without notice takes free of all
prior equities is firmly woven into the fabric of modern jurisprudence. Its
influence is manifest in every branch of the law dealing with the transfer of
property rights. Although the requirements of bona fides and lack of notice
have presented many problems, it is in the application of the value concept that
the New York courts have experienced the greatest difficulty. The material
which follows is a treatment of the rationale of the concept and its position
in the commercial law of New York.
The Rationale of the Value Concept
The term "value" can be understood only when viewed in the perspective of
its place in the bona fide purchase doctrine. This is so because the policy underlying the application of the doctrine has determined the meaning attached to
the value concept. Assume the typical situation: A sells goods to B; because
of fraud in the transaction B gets only a voidable title; B then sells the goods to
C, an innocent purchaser for value without notice of A's prior equity. If A
should attempt to recover the goods or their value from C, the court would
protect the innocent purchaser and defeat recovery. The general rule is that
"a title, like a stream cannot rise higher than its source."' What magic, then,
lies in the bona fide purchase?
The principle that protects the innocent buyer springs from two sources,
equity and the law merchant. 2 In equity, the maxim that where the equities
are equal the legal title will prevail is said to govern the transactionP However, to get at the true basis of the principle it is necessary to go behind this
ready formula. A court of chancery acts upon the conscience of the litigants
before it and will compel a defendant to do only what in foro conscientiae he is
bound to do. 4 Thus equity will stay its hand where, as in the case of a purchaser in good faith, the defending party has a clean conscience.5 More com1. National Bank of Commerce v. Chicago, B. & N. R. Co., 44 Minn. 224, 230-231,
46 N. W. 342, 345 (1890).
2. Whitney, Value and the Doctrine of Bona Fide Purchase (1933) 7 ST. JOuN'ssL. Rv.
181, 185. Professor Bogert recognizes the independent sources of the principle but terms the
rule originally applicable to negotiable instruments, a "companion rule." 4 BooEr-, TRuSTS
(1935) 2554. Cf. HusToN, ENxFORCEIMENT Or DRE:CIS in EQuiTY (1915)
124, 127 where the author rejects the equity view as incomplete and maintains that the
doctrine is based solely on commercial convenience (i.e., that it is ". . . an effort to ensure
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security in commercial transactions and acquisitions . . .").

It is submitted that this view

recognizes only one policy consideration common to both sources. See note 11, infra.
3. CLARx, EQu=rr (1919) § 27; EAToN, EQmnc (2d ed. 1923) § 17; cf. Vow, SA.S
(1931) 382-384 (realistic example of how the maxim is applied).
4.

2 PowxRoy, EQUrry JURiSPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 738.

5. Ibid.; MAnI.MW, EQurry (1909) 119. The older decisions contain extreme statements:
.. against a purchaser for valuable consideration without notice this Court will not take
the least step imaginable." Jerrard v. Saunders, 2 Ves. Jun. 454, 458, 30 Eng. Reprints 721,
80
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plete justice would not be effected by a transfer of the burden of loss from one
innocent person to another. The law merchant protected the bona fide holder
for value of a negotiable instrument, and when questions regarding such a
0
holder came before the courts, they adopted the mercantile view. Here commercial convenience was the primary considerationj
But, it may be asked, what part does value play in the application of the doctrine? The equitable theory outlined above seems to stress only the element
of good faith.8 The law merchant was concerned with the free flow of commerce. To a great extent, the value factor effectuates the policy beldnd the

doctrine. Since only one who gives value is entitled to the security in purchase
which the bona fide principle provides, the value concept may, by proper manipu723 (Ch. 1794); ". . . a court of equity can act only on the conscience of a party; if he
has done nothing that taints it, no demand can attach upon it, so as to give any jurisdiction."
Boone v. Chiles, 35 U. S. 177, 210 (1836). Pomeroy disputes this last point, that the court
has no jurisdiction at all over a bona fide purchaser, and claims that the court has jurisdiction, but will not exercise it. 2 Poamoy, EQuns: JUnvsPRuDrCE (4th ed. 1918) 1514, n. 1.
6. N. Y. LEoss. Doc. (1935) 60 A, p. 8. This was but one phase of the '-muilation of
the law merchant by the common law. For a complete treatment of this movement, see
8 HormswoRaTH, HssroRy or ENGLISr LAw (1926) c. 4. The development of the law of
negotiable instruments is set out in 8 Horzswomru, supra at 146-177.
7. The courts firmly resisted attempts to impair the negotiable character of bills and
notes: "A bank note is constantly and universally, both at home and abroad, treated as
money ... and paid and received, as cash; and it is necessary, for the purposes of commerce,
that their currency should be established and secured." Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452, 459,
97 Eng. Reprints 398, 402 (K. B. 1758) (bona fide holder for value of stolen bill protected).
To the same effect see Grant v. Vaughan, 3 Burr. 1516, 97 Eng. Reprints 957 (K. B. 1764)
(lost bill); Peacock v. Rhodes, 2 Dougl. 634, 99 Eng. Reprints 402 (K. B. 1781) (stolen
bill); Anonymous, 1 Salk. 126, 91 Eng. Reprints 118 (K. B. 1795) (lost note); Collins v.
Martin, 1 Bos. & P. 648, 126 Eng. Reprints 1113 (C. P. 1797) (converted bill). As to
what is meant by commercial convenience, see further, note 12 infra.
8. Langdell injected the value factor into the equitable theory by claiming that in the
(2d ed.
absence of value in a transfer the law implied notice. LA.'nGOD, EQmun- Pr.DL-n
1883) 211. Ames refutes this view in the following: "But this is a perversion of the term
notice. If a volunteer should, before actual notice of any equity, dispose of the title by
gift, surely no claim could properly be made against him. Yet, if be had constructive notice,
he would be liable for a wrong analogous to a breach of trust. If, again, a donee should
sell the property, and subsequently buy it back, he could keep the property, though he
would have to account for the proceeds of his sale; whereas, if he had constructive notice,
he could not keep the property." Ames, Purchase for Value Without Notice (1887) 1 Hv.
L. REv. 1, 3, n. 1.
On the other hand, Ames suggests that while "A decree against a male fide purchaser or
a volunteer is obviously just ... a decree against an innocent purchaser, who has acquired
the legal title to the res, would be as obviously unjust." A-ms, Lzcrun oN LEO.iA. Hasroa"
(1913) 76. To the same effect, see Ames, Purchasefor Value Without Notice (1887) 1 H v.
L. Ray. 1, 3. Questions as to what is just and what is unjust call for value judgments and
consequently open a wide avenue for the entrance of policy considerations. For example,
the change of position of the innocent vendee, mentioned below as one of principal policy
considerations, may be deemed sufficient just reason to withhold a decree. If this extension
of Ames, statement is justifiable, then Ames was in accord with the thesis of the text,
namely, that the policy of the bona fide purchase doctrine finds its expression chiefly through
the application of the value element. Cf. Ames' concluding sentences in Ames, Purchae
for Value Without Notice (1887) 1 HAny. L. Rxv. 1, 16.
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lation of its definition, be employed to select those who merit protection. 9 Two
policy considerations appear to be paramount, commercial convenience 0 and
the change of position of the innocent vendee." In the mercantile view, "that
position is to be preferred which both makes possible the extended continuance
of productive credit and promotes security of transactions."' 2 The idea that
an irrevocable change of position justifiably taken entitles a party to higher
rights than he otherwise would have is not peculiar to the bona fide purchase
doctrine, but is found in many other branches of the law.13 Here, policy dictates
that the innocent purchaser be protected in instances where a transaction may
induce a detrimental change of position.14 It follows from what has been said
that whenever a court is asked to construe the term "value" it is imperative that
regard be had for the considerations of policy underlying the case-law or statutory definition in question.
Value in the New York Common Law
At common law in New York value was deemed to have been given only when
there was a present transfer of money or its equivalent or a change for the worse
in the legal position of the purchaser. I5 Payment in hard cash was the obvious
example of a valuable consideration.' 6 Similarly, value was given when a yen9. Thus a change in the definition of value was resorted to when it was deemed advisable to include a creditor taking in satisfaction of or as security for his antecedent debt
within the protection of the bona fide purchase doctrine. To the same effect see VOLD, SALES
(1931) 383. See notes 38-42, infra.
10. It was in recognition of this policy consideration that antecedent indebtedness was
defined as value in the Uniform Sales Act. 1 UNE'oau LAws ANN. (1931) 448-449.
11. Cf. Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns. 637, 645 (N. Y. 1822).
12. VOLD, SALES (1931) 384. See further on this point: Manning v. McClure, 36 111.
490, 498 (1865); Knox v. Eden Musee American Co., Ltd., 148 N. Y. 441, 454, 42 N. E.
988, 992 (1896); Millhiser Mfg. Co. v. Gallego Mills Co., 101 Va. 579, 602, 44 S. E. 760,
768 (1903); HUsTON, ENFORCEMENT or DECREES iN EQUITY (1915) 130; 7 HOLDSWORT.U,
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1926) 510. As examples of the invasions upon property rights
made to insure security in commercial transactions, Holdsworth mentions sales in market
overt, negotiability of bills and notes, factors' acts and § 25 of the Sale of Goods Act. Ibid.
13. The doctrine of estoppel, which like the bona fide purchase theory crosses many
fields of law, is the foremost example. Closely allied is the promissory estoppel theory
applied in New York to charitable subscriptions. See Allegheny College v. National Chau-

tauqua County Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 373, 159 N. E. 173, 175 (1927);

RESTATEMAENT, CONTRACTS

(1932) § 90. Again, in the field of quasi-contracts, where, for instance, recovery is sought
for money paid under a mistake of fact, if the recipient has irrevocably changed his position
in reliance upon the transfer, recovery is denied. KEENER, QUASI CONTRACTs (1893) 67 et seq.
14. The idea of change of position is incorporated in the equitable theory of the bona
fide purchase doctrine. The test applied is-is it conscionable for the innocent purchaser
to retain the goods against the claim of the innocent vendor. Ames, Purchase for Value
Without Notice (1887) 1 HARv. L. REv. 1, 3. Here, to the good faith in acquisition, Is
added the conscionableness of retention. See Root v. French, 13 Wend. 570, 574 (N. Y.
1835), which employed this test. Cf. note 8, supra.
15. 2 POmEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) 1527 and cases there cited. See
also Jewett v. Palmer, 7 Johns. Ch. 65, 67 (N. Y. 1823); Root v. French, 13 Wend, 570,
572 (N. Y. 1835).
16. 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) 2575.
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dee negotiated or assigned the notes, bonds, or other securities of a third person." 7
Where a pledgee or mortgagee accepted property as security for a loan made at
the time of the transfer, he was deemed a purchaser for value.08 In such instances, the courts felt that the innocent buyers had parted with value capable
of pecuniary measurement on the faith of the transaction. But a donee, devisee,
or heir did not sacrifice or lose anything he possessed. Consequently, it was
held that such a volunteer did not give value.' 9 Neither a trustee in bankruptcy
nor an assignee for the benefit of creditors gave value, for both were voluntary

assignees.20

Where a sale was made on credit the buyer gave no value. 2 ' Not value promised but value actually rendered was required. Thus a vendee was not a purchaser for value where the only consideration for the sale was his own executory
promise, bond, covenant, or contract. 22- It was reasoned that since upon the
failure of consideration the obligation could be cancelled, the promisor suffered
no change of position legally cognizable.P Where part of the consideration was
paid and part remained executory at the time notice of a prior outstanding equity
was given, a vendee could claim the protection of a bona fide purchaser only pro
tanto the amount he paid before notice.2 4 Value was not given by a creditor
who took goods, documents of title, or negotiable instruments in payment oF5
17. 2 Poaraoy, EQurrr JiumSPRUDm'cE (4th ed. 1918) 1543-1544.
18. Id. at 1529.
19. Baker v. Lever, 67 N. Y. 304 (1876); Ten Eyck v. Witbeck, 135 N. Y. 40, 31 N. E.
944 (1892).
20. Assignee: Smith v. Felton, 43 N. Y. 419 (1871); Young v. Heermans, 66 N. Y. 374
(1876); John P. Kane Co. v. Kinney, 174 N. Y. 69, 66 N. E. 619 (1903). Trustee in
bankruptcy: Zartman v. First Nat. Bank, 216 U. S. 134 (1910); Ex parte Fitz, Fed. Cas.
No. 4,837 (1876).
21. 4 BOGERT, Tausrs m.am TRusErEs (1935) 2574; Patridge v. Rubin, 15 Daly 344,
6 N. Y. Supp. 657 (C. P. 1889).
22. Barnard v. Campbell, 58 N. Y. 73 (1874) (purchaser's own notes given for goods);
Moore v. Ryder, 65 N. Y. 433 (1875) (transferee of bill gave unaccepted promise to benefit
third parties); Jewett v. Palmer, 7 Johns. Ch. 65 (N. Y. 1823) (purchaser's own notes
given for land); Freeman v. Denning, 3 Sand. Ch. 327 (N. Y. 1846) (vendee gave own
notes for steamboat) ; Delott v. Starkey, 3 Barb. Ch. 403 (N. Y. 1848) (transferee of note
gave own note); Crandall v. Vickery, 45 Barb. 156 (N. Y. 1865) (transferee of notes gave
own checks). Further, Barnard v. Campbell, supra, held that even though the purchaser's
negotiable note had been negotiated to third parties before he received notice of a prior
fraud, he was not a purchaser for value.
23. Moore v. Ryder, 65 N. Y. 438 (1875); Jewett v. Palmer, 7 Johns. Ch. 65 (N. Y.
1823); Jackson v. Cadwell, 1 Cow. 622 (N. Y. 1824); see Weaver v. Bardon, 49 N. Y. 286,
291-292 (1872); 4 BOGERT, Tausis Azm ThUSTEES (1935) 2574; VoLw, Su zs (1931) 381.
24. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Maltbey, 8 Paige Ch. 361 (N. Y. 1840); Pickett v.
Barron, 29 Barb. 505 (N. Y. 1859); Sargent v. Eureka Sound Apparatus, 46 Hun 19 (N. Y.
1887); see Stalker v. M'Donald, 6 Hill 93, 96 (N. Y. 1843). In Sargent v. Eureka Sound
Apparatus, supra, it was said that the purchaser's payment "subsequent to the time he
becomes affected by notice of it [defect in his vendor's title] will be treated as in his own
wrong, and not available as against such equity for any purpose." Id. at 20. The theory
being that payments made with notice are not bona fide.
25. McBride v. The Farmers' Bank, 26 N. Y. 450 (1863); Lawrence v. Clark, 36 N. Y.
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or as security for 26 an antecedent indebtedness. The decisions uniformly dedared that there had been no change in the creditor's legal status to his detriment, for the debt was reinstated when the creditor was compelled to restore
the property or its equivalent to the innocent vendor.27 In the case of a creditor
who took merely for the security of his debt, it was said that he gave nothing
28
for the security and consequently lost nothing when it was taken from him.
In general, any surrender of an existing legal right, except the extinguishment of an antecedent indebtedness, was deemed a change of position sufficient to
warrant the assertion that value was given. 29 Thus, where the creditor expressly contracted to extend the time of payment and received for his promise
new collateral, he was a purchaser for value of the collateral so advanced.8 0
128 (1867); Weaver v. Bardon, 49 N. Y. 286 (1872); Stevens v. Brennan, 79 N. Y. 254
(1879); Note (1926) 44 A. L. R. 488.
There was a conflict as to whether a holder who took a negotiable instrument in absolute,
as distinguished from conditional extinguishment of an antecedent debt was a holder for
value. Absolute extinguishment was value: Mayer v. Heidelbach, 123 N. Y. 332, 25 N. E.
416 (1890) ; Bank of St. Albans v. Gilliland, 23 Wend. 311 (N. Y. 1840) ; Bank of Sanduslhy
v. Scoville, 24 Wend. 115 (1840); see Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Church, 81 N. Y. 218, 221 (1880).
Contra: McBride v. Farmers' Bank, supra; Lawrence v. Clark, supra; Rosa v. Brotherson,
10 Wend. 85 (N. Y. 1833).
Where part of the consideration given was cash and part was in satisfaction of an antecedent debt, the cages were again in conflict. A purchaser who gives part cash and applies
the rest to a debt gives value: Mechanics' & Traders' Bank v. Crow, 60 N. Y. 85 (1875);
Moyer v. McIntyre, 43 Hun 58 (N. Y. 1887) (distinguishing the Weaver case, infra, on
the ground that it was in equity, whereas the instant case was at law). Contra: Weaver
v. Barden, 49 N. Y. 286 (1872). A peculiar holding on the same point was given in
Victoria Paper Mills v. New York & Pa. Co., 28 Misc. 123, 58 N. Y. Supp. 1070 (Sup.
Ct. 1899) (see also the lower court's opinion in 27 Misc. 179, 57 N. Y. Supp. 397 [N. Y.
City Ct. 18991). In this case a creditor attempted to bring himself within the bona fide
purchase rule by paying fifty dollars, on the advice of counsel, in addition to crediting the
value of the goods to his sixteen hundred dollar debt. Held, that although no fraud was
proven, the transaction was tainted with "legal dishonesty" and the creditor was not a
bona fide purchaser.
26. Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns. 637 (N. Y. 1822); Stevens v. Brennan, 79 N. Y. 254
(1879) ; United States Nat. Bank v. Ewing, 131 N. Y. 506, 30 N. E. 501 (1892) (no mention
of Negotiable Instruments Law); Root v. French, 13 Wend. 570 (N. Y. 1835); Stalker
v. M'Donald, 6 Hill 93 (N. Y. 1843).
27. Whitney, loc. cit. supra note 2, at 195; VOLD, SALES (1931) 382. The decisions
commonly state that "a purchaser of the legal title, who receives his conveyance merely in
consideration of a prior indebtedness, is not entitled to protection; because he has lost
nothing by the purchase." Padgett v. Lawrence, 10 Paige Ch. 170, 180 (N. Y. 1843).
28. The leading case of Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns. 637 (N. Y. 1822) sets out the
reasons as follows: "But what superior equity has the holder, who made no advances, nor
incurred any responsibility on the credit of the paper he received, whose situation will be
improved, if he is allowed to retain, but, if not, is in the condition he was before the paper
was passed? To allow such a state of facts as sufficient to resist the title of the real owner,
would be productive of manifest injustice, and is not required by any rule of policy. ...
29. 2 PoMEROY, EQUITY JU.ISPRUDENCIE (4th ed. 1918) 1530.
30. Mechanics' & Farmers' Bank of Albany v. Wixon, 42 N. Y. 438 (1870); La Manna
v. Munroe, 48 App. Div. 495, 62 N. Y. Supp. 984 (2d Dep't 1900); Berner v. Kaye, 14
Misc. 1, 35 N. Y. Supp. 181 (C. P. 1895).
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Again, value was given in a transaction where the vendee of goods in exchange
therefor parted with the equitable title to land 1 Value was also given where
the transferee assumed a new and irrevocable legal obligation,32 unless the
obligation was founded upon his own executory promise running only to the
transferor 33 Here, the change of position was self-evident. Typical of this
form of value was an undertaking by a vendee to make himself primarily liable
for an obligation owed to a third person by the vendor.it
At common law, the terms "consideration" or "good consideration" had to
be sharply distinguished from "value" or "valuable consideration" as the latter
terms were understood in the application of the bona fide purchase principle.
In many transactions the consideration sufficient to support a simple contract
also constituted value. 5 However, while an executory promise or payment of
an antecedent obligation were clearly good considerations, they were consistently
held not to provide valuable consideration.30 The enactment of the various Uniform Laws have altered the definition of value chiefly with respect to this distinction. The changes thus made will now be considered.
Value Under the Uniform Laws
The definition of value contained in the Uniform Trust Receipts Act expresses
the meaning generally attached to the term under the Uniform Laws. It reads:
"'Value' means any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. An
antecedent indebtedness or pre-existing claim, whether for money or not, ...
constitutes value where goods, documents, or instruments are taken either in
satisfaction thereof or as security therefor." 38
The Negotiable Instruments Law,32 Sales Act,40 Warehouse Receipts Act, '
Bills of Lading Act,4 and Stock Transfer Act 43 all contain definitions to the
44
same effect.
31. Westbrook v. Gleason, 79 N. Y. 23 (1879).
(4th ed. 1918) 1530-1531. One who agrees to
32. 2 Pommoy, EQUITY JURusPRUDmcEt
indemnify a husband against the debts of his wife gives value. Reed v. Gannon, 3 Daly

414 (N. Y. 1871).
33. The reason for the exception was pointed out at p. 83, supra.
34. William v. Shelly, 37 N. Y. 375 (1867).
35. See notes 16, 17, 18, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 34, supra.
36. See notes 21, 22, 23, 24 and 27, supra.
37. The words "and whether against the transferee or against another pernon" have been
omitted because they do not appear in the other acts.

38. N. Y. Pans. Pxop. LAw (1934) § 51 (15); U. T. R. A. § 1.
39. For the definition contained in the Negotiable Instruments Law see note 48, infra.
40. N. Y. Pans. PRoP. LAw (1935) § 156; U. S. A. § 76.
41. N. Y. Grsv. Bus. LAW (1909) § 142; U. W. R. A. § 58.

42. N. Y. PERs. PRop. LAW (1935) § 239; U B. L. A. § 53.
43. N. Y. PaRs. Pxop. LAW (1913) § 183; U. S. T. A. § 22.
44. it is important to note that these enactments do not change the law concerning
transfer of realty [Orthey v. Bogan, 226 N. Y. 234, 123 N. E. 487 (1919) (one who takes
a mortgage in absolute satisfaction of an antecedent debt does not give value)] and chosses
in action other than those directly covered by the Acts. Further, it is probable that the
law controlling conditional sales likewise remains unchanged (see p. 91, in fra). Consequently, as to such subject matter the common law understanding of value still prevails.
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Striking are the changes made. In the first place, all good considerations
now constitute value. 45 In addition, value is given when goods, documents of
title, negotiable instruments, or stock certificates are received as security for
an antecedent debt. Although no consideration is passed in this transaction
the change is justifiable. As a matter of business practice, though forbearance
is not expressly bargained for, the transfer of collateral security almost invariably causes the creditor to cease in his efforts to satisfy his debt from other
sources. 46
It was only in the application of the definition laid down in the Negotiable
Instruments Law that difficulty was encountered. This law, one of the first
uniform acts accepted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 47 did not include the taking of an instrument as security for
an antecedent debt with the same specificity found in the later acts.48 There
resulted a conflict of opinion in the lower courts49 and it was not until the case
Two new concepts, "fair consideration" and "new value" have been set up. They must
be sharply distinguished from value. The definition of "fair consideration" is found only
in the Fraudulent Conveyances Act [N. Y. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW (1925) § 272;
U. F. C. A. § 31. It reads: "Fair consideration is given for property, or obligation, (a)
When in exchange for such property, or obligation, as a fair equivalent therefor, and in
good faith, property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied, or (b) When such
property, or obligation is received in good faith to secure a present advance or antecedent
debt in amount not disproportionately small as compared with the value of the property,
or obligation obtained." The definition of "new value" is contained only in the Trust
Receipts Act [N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1934) § 51 (7); U. T. R. A. § 1]. It reads: "'New
value' includes new advances or loans made, or new obligation incurred, or the release or
surrender of a valid and existing security interest, or the release of a claim to proceeds under
section ten; but 'new value' shall not be construed to include extension or renewals of
existing obligations of the trustee, nor obligations substituted for such existing obligations."
Both definitions must be read in the light of the objectives of the acts in which they are
found.
45. But compare Professor Vold's argument, that an executory promise does not constitute value, at p. 92, infra.
46. N. Y. LEois. Doc. (1935) 60 A, p. 16; CLARK, EQurry (1919) 404; VOLD, SAus
(1931) 383; 2 WiLLISTON, SAIEs (2d ed. 1924) 1563; Kennedy, Value-A Plea for Unitormity
in New York Commercial Law (1933) 8 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 1, 8. Referring to negotiable
instruments, one court justified its holding on this point as follows: ". . . by the almost
universal usage of the world of commerce, a transaction of this sort is understood by the
parties to imply further forbearance on the pre-existing debt, and thus the indorsee Is lulled
into a false security by means of an instrument which the person sought to be held liable
has made and put into circulation." Manning v. McClure, 36 Ill. 490, 498 (1865).
47. 5 Ui opm LAWS ANN. (1923) pref. v.
48. The Negotiable Instruments Law defines value as follows: "Value is any consideration
sufficient to support a simple contract. An antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value;
and is deemed such whether the instrument is payable on demand or at a future time."
N. Y. NaG. INST. LAW (1909) § 51; U. N. I. A. § 25. Another section provides: "Where
the holder has a lien on the instrument, arising either from contract or by implication of
law, he is deemed a holder for value to the extent of his lien." N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW (1909)
§ 53; U. N. I. A. § 27. In Illinois the Negotiable Instruments Law was amended so as
to expressly include taking as security for an antecedent debt within the value definition.
ILL. STATE BAR STATS.

49.

(1935) c. 98, § 45.

Taking as security for an antecedent debt is not value: Sutherland v. Mead, 80 App.
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of Kelso & Co. v. Ellis,50 decided some twenty years after the passage of the

Law, that the Court of Appeals spoke on the point, and then only by way of
dictum. There it indicated its approval of those cases which recognized the intended alteration of the common law and construed the definition to include the
taking of collateral to secure pre-existing indebtedness 1
Until 1935 New York did not incorporate the uniform definition of value in

the Bills of Lading and Sales ActsP 2 When those bills came up before the legislature in 1911 the Merchants Association of New York City vigorously resisted

the changeY 3 As indicated by its brief filed with legislative committees, the
association was fearful lest the proposed bill open up a new avenue for fraud."
Div. 103, 80 N. Y. Supp. 504 (ist Dep't 1903); Roseman v. Mahoney, 86 App. Div. 377,
83 N. Y. Supp. 749 (2d Dep't 1903); Ragowski v. Brill, 131 N. Y. Supp. 5S89 (Sup. Ct.
1911). One who takes as security for an antecedent debt gives value: Brewster v. Shrader,
26 Mlsc. 480, 57 N. Y. Supp. 606 (Sup. Ct. 1899).
50. 224 N. Y. 528, 121 N. E. 364 (1918).
51. Kelso & Co. v. Ellis, 224 N. Y. 528, 536, 121 N. E. 364, 366 (1918). The court
commented upon the situation as follows: "The New York rule was so well establisbed that
the inertia of Coddington v. Bay carried it along for some distance before the external force
of the Negotiable Instruments Law acted upon it." Id. at 537, 121 N. E. at 366.
52. Sales Act definition: N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 455, § 1; N. Y. PEas. Prop. L.P: (1935)
§ 156; U. S. A. § 76. Bills of Lading Act definition: N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 455, § 2; N. Y.
PE s. PROP. LAw (1935) § 239; U. B. L. A. § 53.
53. While the Uniform Bills of Lading Act was still in the process of construction, the
Merchants Association filed a brief against the incorporation of the uniform definition
of value with the committee on Commercial Law of the American Bar Association. 34
A. B. A. REP. (1909) 1085. Opposition was also expressed at the same forum by the
Merchants and Miners Transportation Company and by various carriers using the "Standard"
bill of lading. Burdick, A Revival of Codification (1910) 10 CoL. L. Rv. 118, 126-127.
The Merchants Association did not have an opportunity to oppose the Sales Act definition
because it "woke up on 1906 after the Act had been recommended by the commis-ioners
of Uniform State Laws." 31 A. B. A. RE,. (1907) 57.
54. The brief made the point that goods could be safely sold on credit for the purpoze
of resale only if the seller could rely upon laws which compelled his vendee to secure a fair
present equivalent for them (hypothetical cases were set out, e.g., a transfer of goods in
exchange for an annuity or a promise not to sue). Further, the omison of the definition
would not impair the Acts. Here an analogy was drawn to the Bankruptcy Act which
left questions, such as the validity of transfers, to the existing state law. Arguments which
had been advanced to support the uniform definition of value were then rebutted. The
definition is not desirable merely because it is found in the Negotiable Instruments Act.
Not only is there an historical difference between such promises to pay money and the
transfer of actual goods and commodities, but there is a substantial difference from the
point of the credit given. To advocate the inclusion of the definition here because it has
been incorporated in the Warehouse Receipts Act is merely to say that the definition is
desirable because the Commissioners have elsewhere said it is desirable. The hypothetical
cases set out are not rare (citing cases). English precedent is not valid because in England
credit on an open account where the goods are intended for resale is not given as frequently
as it is done in the United States. Uniformity for uniformity's sake has no virtue. "Uniformity in conformity with bad precedent and based upon an ignorance of the kind of transactions upon which the greatness of trade of New York and the prosperity of the country
dependent upon it has been built up, is undesirable." [p. 11]. The definition is not in
accord with the mercantile idea. A representative group of merchants is eminently qualified
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Prior to this time, the same body had waged a losing battle, at meetings under
the auspices of the American Bar Association, against the inclusion of the novel
value definition in the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Actr 5 Again, when the
last mentioned act was under consideration in New York, the Merchants Association appeared and argued in opposition before the governor.,0 However, the
Warehouse Receipts Act when enacted in 1907 contained the new definition of
value. 57 Finally, although the Bills of Lading and Sales Acts passed in 1911 deleted the definition of value set forth in the uniform acts, the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act enacted two years later appeared with the uniform definition intact.58

The omission from the Bills of Lading and Sales Acts left the law in a confused
and unsatisfactory condition." If goods were given in extinguishment of an
antecedent indebtedness, the creditor did not give value.00 But if the goods
were first placed in a warehouse and a warehouse receipt was issued, the transferee who cancelled a pre-existing debt in return for the receipt gave value. 0'
Again, if the goods were shipped and a bill of lading was given the creditor to
satisfy his claim, he gave no value.0 2 Nevertheless, if the shipment was interstate in nature, the federal rule, recognizing antecedent indebtedness as value,

to make a decision on this point and the Merchants Association "desires to go on record
as saying that this definition does not conform to the mercantile view, but that it is wholly
subversive of the mercantile view and wholly undesirable and dangerous from the Mercantile
standpoint." [p. 1013]. In conclusion it was stated that the Merchants Association was
"an association which has some two thousand members, which more than any other body
may be said to have the largest interest in the law merchant." Library of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York, Pamph. Vol. 217 (1911).
5. 34 A. B. A. REP. (1909) 1077, 1092.
56. Brief of the Merchants Association of New York City in Opposition-to the passage
of the Warehouse Receipts Act (before the Governor of the State of New York, July, 1907),
Library of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Pamph. Vol. 217. Here,
as in the brief submitted four years later (see note 54, supra), the Association opposed the
new definition on the ground that it would make fraud easy. "In any action to set aside
a transfer as fraudulent, brought by general creditors, under this definition of value the
defense would have no difficulty in proving that value was given in accordance with the
section. . . . Under the proposed bill the unscrupulous merchant is given by this statute
a legalized method of cheating his creditors." Id. at 14-15.
57. N. Y. Gas. Bus. LAw (1909) § 142; U. W. R. A. § 58.
58. N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW (1913) § 183; U. S. T. A. § 22. The American Warehousemen's Association was strongly in favor of the Uniform Act. [Brief of Merchants Association, loc. cit. supra note 54, at 5-63. It may have been due to this fact that the
definition was enacted over the protests of the Merchants Association.
59. Miller, Antecedent Indebtedness as Constituting Value in New York (1913) 13 CoL.
L. R v. 612, 624.
60. See note 25, supra. If on the same facts, the case were tried in the federal courts,
the ruling would be to the contrary. See note 63, infra.
61. N. Y. GEx. Bus. LAw (1909) § 142; U. W. R. A. § 58; cf. Standard Bank v. Lowman,
1 F. (2d) 935 (W. D. Wash. 1924) (taking receipt as security for antecedent debt); Warner
v. Tyng Warehouse Co., 71 Utah 303, 265 Pac. 748 (1928) (same).
62. This result was reached because the omission of the uniform definition in the Bills
of Lading Act left the common law definition in force. See note 25, supra.
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would operate to make the creditor a purchaser for value of the billp The
situation was confusing to an extreme degree.
In addition to the resultant confusion there were other considerations which
called for the enactment of the uniform definition. As indicated above, a creditor who received collateral for his debt might substantially change his position
on the faith of the transfer." This was also true of a creditor who took in payment of the indebtedness. Here the probability of a detrimental change of
position was even stronger, for having received what he thought was a binding
satisfaction of the obligation, the creditor was justified in considering the transaction at end. Since his future business dealings would have been regulated
accordingly, a subsequent unsettling of the situation by restoration of the property to the innocent vendor reached an unjust result. While the courts, with
eyes averted from the actual circumstances, declared that reinstatement of the
debt restored him to his prior legal position, the fact remained, that the creditor
was likely to be left in an irrevocably changed business situation05 without
effective recourse to his immediate transferor.0 0
Further, the basic purpose behind the uniform movement was to standardize
commercial law in the several states. While New York was quick to appreciate
the advantages of uniform legislation, 7 the passage of the Bills of Lading and
Sales Acts without the new value definition effected a partial frustration of its
68
primary consideraturM.
63. Although the Federal Bills of Lading Act omitted the uniform definition of value
[39 STAT. 545 (1916), 49 U. S. C. A. § 122 (1926)], federal case-law applied a rule in
harmony with the one found in the uniform acts. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U. S. 1 (1842); Railroad Co. v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 14 (1880); Baldwin v. Childs, 249 N. Y. 212, 163
N. E. 737 (1928). In commenting upon this situation Professor Llewellyn said: '"Making
the rights of a purchaser depend upon the accident of whether the shipment was intended
to cross the state line or on whether the suit is brought in the State or Federal Court, is
arbitrary, and serves no purpose except confusion? Llewellyn (for the Commis-ion on
Uniform State Laws), Memorandum in support of an amendment to Personal Property LawI
Sections 156 and 239, to remove inconsistencies in the law of VAruE in the transfer of
personal property in New York, p. 2.
64. See note 46, supra.
65. Lsnis. Doc. (1935) 60 A, p. 16; Vor.D, SALS (1931) 382; Kennedy, ioc. cit. supra
note 46, at 8; Whitney, loc. cit. supra note 2, at 195.
66. "At the time of the transaction the debt may have been otherwise collectible, and
would have been collected had it not been settled for by the transfer of the goods. When
that transfer is later rescinded by operation of law and the goods restored to the original
defrauded. party, the fraudulent buyer may have become insolvent or have concealed his
assets."

Votw, SAI.ES (1931) 382-383.

67. This is evidenced by New York's prompt adoption of uniform legislation. New
York was the first state to enact the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. 9 U,nrxo= LAws Amr.
(Supp. 1934) Supp. p. 123. It was among the first few states to enact the Negotiable
Instruments Act, the Warehouse Receipts Act and the Bills of Lading Act and was the
eighth state to pass the Sales Act. 1, 3, 4, 5 UNa'Ro
LAws Am.,:;, pref.
68. Numerous papers advocating the adoption of the uniform definition were written.
Lr~is. Doc. (1935) 60 A; Llewellyn, loc. cit. supra note 63; Kennedy, loc. cit. supra note 46;
Kennedy, Creditors as Purchasers for Value in Net, Yorl. (1930) 84 N. Y. L. J. 1430;
Whitney, loc. cit. supra note 2; Whitney, Value-A Reply to Professor Kennedy (1934)
8 ST. Jom's L. Rrv. 285. All but Professor Whitney's articles advocated incorporation of
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Problems Arising From the Uniform Definition of Value
Many sections of the New York Personal Property Law are directly affected
by the new definitions of value.6 9 In the main, the changes follow the principles
set out above. However, the recent amendments have brought to the fore two
interesting questions: does the definition of value in the Sales Act apply to sales
within the Conditional Sales Act and does an executory promise constitute
the uniform definition in both the Bills of Lading and Sales Act. Professor Whitney
favored the enactment of the definition in the Bills of Lading Act but opposed its Inclusion
in the Sales Act. His argument proceeded as follows: A single standard of value should
not be applied to all transfers irrespective of the nature of the property transferred; If
social and business needs require that a certain type of property possess a high degree of
negotiability, the standard of value necessary to protect the innocent purchaser should be
correspondingly low; while negotiable bills of lading do require a high degree of negotiability,
chattels as such do not; consequently, no change should be made in the definition of value
insofar as it applies to chattels. Whitney, Value and the Doctrine of Bona Fide Purchase
(1933) 7 ST. JoHN's L. Rxv. 181, 203-204.
69. N. Y. PEaS. PROP. LAW (1911) §§ 101 (4), 226 (d) [U. S. A. § 20 (4) ; U. B. L. A.
§ 40 (d)]: Both sections are to the effect that where a bill of lading with draft attached
is sent directly to the buyer, a bona fide purchaser for value of the bill from the buyer
will obtain good title to the goods, even though the draft had not been honored.
N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW (1911) §§ 106, 225 [U. S. A. § 25; U. B. L. A. § 39]: Both
sections are to the effect that where goods or negotiable documents of title are left with
the seller after a sale or transfer thereof, a purchaser in good faith for value from the
seller obtains good title to the goods or documents.
N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1935) § 119 [U. S. A. § 38 as amended]: A transferee in good
faith for value of a negotiable document of title obtains good title to the instrument even
though the negotiation to him or a prior holder was a breach of duty on the part of
the person making the negotiation, or "the owner of the document was deprived of the
possession of the same by loss, theft, fraud, accident, mistake, duress or conversion."
N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAw (1911) § 224 [U. B. L. A. § 38] is to the same effect with the
exception that it does not in terms include theft and loss. Further, it is interesting to note
that since the former section iN. Y. PERs. PROP. LAw (1935) § 119 (U. S. A. § 38 as amended)]
employs the term "negotiable documents of title," complete negotiability is now extended
to dock warrants and "any other document used in the ordinary course of business In the
sale or transfer of goods as proof of the possession or control of the goods, or authorizing or
purporting to authorize the possession of the document to transfer or receive either by
endorsement or by delivery, goods represented by such document" where it is stated that
the goods referred to in the document will be delivered to the bearer or to the order of
any person named therein. N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1911) §§ 108, 156 (1) [U. S. A.
§8 27, 76 (1)].
N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1911) §§ 143, 228 [U. S. A. § 62; U. B. L. A. § 42): No seller's
lien or right of stoppage in transitu shall defeat the rights of a purchaser for value in good
faith to whom a negotiable document of title has been negotiated.
N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1911) § 105 [U. S. A. § 24]: A bona fide purchaser for value
from a vendor who has a voidable title to goods obtains a good title to the same.
N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAw (1911) § 192 [U. B. L. A. § 6]: If negotiable bills of lading
are issued in sets, "the carrier issuing them shall be liable for failure to deliver the goods
described therein to any one who purchases a part for value in good faith, even though
the purchase be after the delivery of goods by the carrier to a holder of one of the other parts."
N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAw (1911) § 193 [U. B. L. A. § 7]: Where a carrier Issues more than
one bill for the same goods and fails to mark "duplicate" on those not intended as the
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70
This
value? In the Conditional Sales Act there is no definition of value.
great
the
omission is explained by the Commissioners as follows: "In view of
variety of definitions of 'value' it is deemed wise to leave that question to be
determined by the pre-existing local law and not to attempt to make uniform
the law by a definition in this act."71 Taken by itself, the explanation would
seem to indicate that the common law of a state should be read into the provisions
of the Act. This view is substantiated by the framework of the Sales Act definition: "In this article, unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires:
'value' means .... ,72 Further, one jurisdiction in which both acts are in force
has held them to be in nowise coextensive. 73 Thus it may well be argued that
the Acts are to be independently applied.
But Professor Bogert, the draftsman of the Conditional Sales Act, is of the
opinion that where the general Sales Act is in force, the uniform definition of
value ought to apply to conditional as well as absolute salesY4 Furthermore,
both before and after the enactment of the former statute the New York courts

purchaser for value in good faith who has purchased one of them as an original.
N. Y. PEns. PROP. LAw (1911) § 200 [U. B. L. A. § 14]: Where a carrier neglects to
take up and cancel a negotiable bill upon delivery of the goods it shall be liable to a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value of the bill.
original, the carrier shall be liable to a

N. Y. Pans. PROP. LAW (1911)

§ 201 (b) [U. B. L. A. § 15 (b)]: Where a carrier de-

livers part of the goods without indicating such delivery on the bill, it shall be liable to
a subsequent boa fide purchaser for value of the bill.
N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW (1911) § 209 [U. B. L. A. § 23]: A carrier shall be liable for
non-receipt or misdescription of the goods to a purchaser for value in good faith who has
relied on such receipt or description.
70. The sections in the Conditional Sales Act which concern the bona fide purchaser for
value are the various filing provisions: N. Y. Pars. PRop. LAw (1922) §§ 65, 68, 69, 74;
U. C. S. A. §§ 5, 8, 9, 14.
71. 2 UnI'Rom LAWS A'nr. (1922) 7. Further, in the Commlisoners' note to section 27
of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, it is stated that "The Uniform Sales Act does not
expressly refer to conditional sales, but only to sales where the title is renerved as security
for the payment of the price." Id. at 41. In this connection it should be noted that the
section of the Conditional Sales Act, which lists the law which should be applied to situations not provided for in the Act, does not mention the Sales Act, nor does it, in any
fashion, make specific reference to the law of sales in general. N. Y. Pas. Pnop. L,.'
(1922) § 80-h; U. C. S. A. § 29.
72. N. Y. PEas. PRop. LAW (1935) § 156; U. S. A. § 76.
73. Anchor Concrete Machinery Co. v. Pennsylvania Brick & Tile Co., 292 Pa. 86, 140
Ati. 766 (1928). In this case the court applied § 5 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act
and held that § 23 of the Uniform Sales Act could have no application to conditional sales.
It stated that, "It will be further noted that the Sales Act did not purport to deal with
conditional sales, which were made the subject of a separate uniform law, adopted by the
commissioners the same year.... An examination of the two acts shows it was not the
purpose to define the rights of the purchasers from conditional vendees by the former
legislation?' Id. at 92, 140 Atl. at 767. Cf. Sherer-Gillett Co. v. Long, 318 Ill. 432, 149
N. E. 225 (1925).
74. 2a UsvoaaR LAws Aimr. (1924) 80. Another authority, without discussing the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act, concludes that conditional sales come within the scope of
the Uniform Sales Act. M.ASsiz, SAxEs (1930) § 11.
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have applied remedies for breach of warranty provided for in the Sales Act
to conditional sales.75 In addition, those cases contain broad statements to the
effect that the general act where applicable governs conditional contracts of
sale. 76 Unless the legislature intervenes, the answer to the problem will depend
solely 7on whether the courts give these statutes a liberal or a strict interpretation. 7
In stating above that under the uniform acts, consideration was identified with
value, 78 it was assumed that an executory promise constitutes value. But this
has been questioned by Professor Vold. He maintains that the Sales Act, designed to codify the law, cannot be interpreted to have changed the common
law rule. 79 Following the reasoning of the early decisions, he insists that where
the original innocent vendor recovers the goods from the innocent purchaser,
the latter "can generally be at least substantially compensated for the loss of
the goods by the cancellation of his obligation to pay for them." 80 But here,
just as in the case of a creditor taking goods in satisfaction of or security for
his debt, a change of position on the part of the vendee is more than a mere
possibility. Resale agreements may have been entered into or opportunities to
make equivalent purchases may have been lost.
Professor Void also points out s that under a section of the Negotiable Instruments Law a transferee who received the note in exchange for a promise to
pay for it is a holder for value only pro tanto the amount paid before notice of
the infirmity.82 This is deemed significant since the Law contains the same
definition of value8 3 (as any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract) found in subsequent uniform acts and was in fact the source of the
75. Before the passage of the Conditional Sales Act: Peuser v. Marsh, 218 N. Y. 505,
113 N. E. 494 (1916); G. B. Shearer Co. v. Kakoulis, 144 N. Y. Supp. 1077 (County Ct.
1913). After the Act was passed: Russo v. Lavender, 216 App. Div. 823, 215 N. Y. Supp.
642 (2d Dep't 1926); Studebaker Corp. of America v. Silverberg, 199 N. Y. Supp. 190 (Sup.
Ct. 1923); see Wurlitzer v. Pappas, 215 App. Div. 23, 25, 213 N. Y. Supp. 52, 53 (4th
Dep't 1925). An Arizona case decided while both Acts were in force in that state Is In
accord with these decisions. Old Pueblo Motors, Inc. v. Ysias Abarca, 37 Ariz. 29, 288
Pac. 666 (1930).
76. "It is manifest that the contract between this plaintiff and the defendant was a
conditional sale, and therefore comes within the provisions of this act [Sales Act] which
relates both to contracts to sell or sale, in that it states in so many words, that such contracts may be both absolute and conditional." G. B. Shearer Co. v. Kakoulis, 144 N. Y. Supp.
1077 (County Ct. 1913). Similar language and reasoning is found in the opinion of the
Appellate Division in Peuser v. Marsh, 167 App. Div. 604, 153 N. Y. Supp. 381 (3d Dep't
1915), cited note 75, supra. Cf. Charles M. Steiff, Inc. v. Wilson, 150 Md. 597, 135 AtI. 407
(1926); Holmes v. Schneder, 176 Minn. 483, 223 N. W. 908 (1929).
77. It would seem that the Court of Appeals is inclined toward a liberal view. "How
far the rule in this State as to the meaning of 'value' has been changed by the revision of
the statutes . . . we do not now consider. If it survives, it has been subjected to many
inroads." Baldwin v. Childs, 249 N. Y. 212, 216, 163 N. E. 737, 738 (1928).
78. See p. 86, supra.
79. VOLD, SALx-s (1931) 381.
8o. Ibid.
81. Id. at 381, nn. 31, 32.
82. N. Y. NEG. INsT. LAw (1909) § 93; U. N. I. A. § 54.
83. N. Y. NEG. INsT. LAW (1909) § 51; U. N. I. A. § 25.
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later definitions. 84 But the application of the definition is here limited by the
above mentioned section. No such restriction is contained in the later acts.
From this it might be argued that the intent was to dispense with its effect.
Besides, the limiting section has been criticized as inconsistent with another
section of the Negotiable Instruments Lawes which provides that a holder in
due course takes free from defenses available to prior parties between them88
selves.
Professor Williston, the draftsman of the Sales Act, is of the opinion that no
good reason exists for depriving a purchaser of the benefit of his bargain because payment is to be made in the future87 and suggests that the innocent
vendor "should be obliged to get relief from the enforcement, for his advantage,
of the obligation of the purchaser to pay the price. 88 Answering this Professor
Void remarks that the argument is not founded upon judicial precedent83 and
that it "seems to beg the question by some tacit assumption that the transfer
of the 'legal title' becomes indefeasible if the technical formula of 'for value
without notice' can be applied thereto." 00 If, as claimed, Professor Williston's
conclusions were founded on a blind logic which ignored the true policy basis
of the bona fide purchase doctrine and regarded only the terms in which the
doctrine is cast, then Professor Vold's criticism might be justifiedp However,
Professor Williston's argument does not appear to be based upon a syllogistic
application of the definition, but rather upon a policy of commercial convenience favoring the security of transactions. Again, how can it be claimed that
an express statutory mandate should not be enforced because no precedent for
its construction can be found? True, the policy underlying a definition of
value must ordinarily be looked to in order to comprehend its scope,02 but
where the statute is as precise as this one, there is not much room for the judicial interpolation of qualifying ideas. Whether it be said that commercial convenience warrants the interpretation or statutory languange is conclusive upon
the point, it seems clear that an executory promise constitutes value.
The policy underlying the uniform definition of value finds its source in
altered social conditions. In recognition of the fact that the present commercial
machine is vitally geared to a credit economy, changes were effected which
facilitated credit transactions. The protection extended to both purchasers
for executory considerations and creditors taking in satisfaction or of security
84.

2 WImisToN, SALES (2d ed. 1924) 1561.

85.

N. Y. NEG. INst. LAW (1909)

§ 96; U. N. I. A. § 57.

86. BAioixN, NoTmuu INsmumNm-s LAw (Chaffee's ed. 1926) 410.
87. 2 WUZ
Nro,
SArXs (2d ed. 1924) § 620.
88. Ibid.
89.

Vor , SALES (1931)

381, n. 32.

90. Ibid.
91. Professor Void convincingly demonstrates that the usual explanation of the bona fide
purchase doctrine, which is "merely some verbal expression of the familiar formula, using

the traditional terminology of legal title, that the buyer's transfer of a legal title to a purchaser for value without notice cuts off equities under the equity doctrine or maxim that
-where the equities are equal the legal title prevails," is an unsatisfactory and non-realistic
description of the principle. VOLD, SArs (1931) 378. He comes to the conclusion that the
rule is bottomed upon considerations of policy. Id. at 379.
92. See p. 82, supra.
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for antecedent debts seems well calculated to encourage dealings on credit.
Further, the new policy mirrors a general trend in the law from caveat emptor
to caveat dominus.93 The problem involves a delicate balance of security in title
and security of purchase. Modern views inclined towards the maintenance
of unhampered commercial intercourse favor the latter.

THE ADVISORY OPINION AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME CoURT.-Perhaps
no other American institution has been subjected to more bitter and incisive
criticism,' and e converso, been defended with a greater abundance of encomiums
and hosannas 2 than has the Supreme Court of the United States. Notwithstanding this sharp contrast in opinion, partisans of all factions, whether of
the conservative or extremist varieties, appear to be reconciled on the fundamental reality of the role of that historic tribunal in shaping mhch of our
present pattern and philosophy.3 Consequently, any proposal relating to the
discharge of that responsibility must, of necessity, touch upon the whole
mechanism of our system, and is therefore particularly worthy of examination.
Shortly after the decision in the highly celebrated and much debated Schechter
Case,4 a number of resolutions proposing an amendment to the Constitution

were introduced in the House of Representatives to enlarge the jurisdiction of

the Court so as to enable it to act in an advisory capacity. Seemingly moved
by the two year spectacle of insecurity and uncertainty which attended the life
of the N.I.R.A., and of the waste and confusion which resulted from its demise
at the hands of a unanimous bench, the proponents of these resolutions visioned
in this stratagem a means of avoiding repetition of that scene in the future
93. HUSTON, ENFORCEMENT OF DEcREs IN EQUITY (1915) 128; cf. Comment (1935>
4 FoPDAr
L. Rxv. 295 (decline of caveat emptor in the sale of food).
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May 27, 1935; the entire code structure was to expire on the succeeding June 16; see 48
STAT. 195, 196, 15 U. S. C. A. § 701 (c) [Supp. 1934]). See Comment (1935) 4 FoRDuAPJ
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5. On June 17, 1935, Congressman Tolan introduced a bill in the House of Representatives proposing an amendment to the Constitution whereby the "President or either House
of Congress, at any time may require from the Supreme Court an opinion upon the
constitutionality of any Act passed by Congress, and the Supreme Court shall render such
opinion in writing." H. J. REs. 317, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). On July 9, Representative
Maas offered an amendment declaring that no Act of Congress shall become a law unless

